# authenticate-as.credential.tenant > Act in accounts with the credentials it holds. Reach tenant, undo no. Which published deployment shapes have it, at what barrier, and what the starting mandates say. *Source: · site v0.11.0 · this file is generated from the same content as the page, so the two cannot drift. Every page on this site has a `.md` twin; internal links below point at them.* --- [Home](../../../index.md) / [The model](../../../model/index.md) / [The capabilities](../../../model/capabilities/index.md) / authenticate-as.credential.tenant # `authenticate-as.credential.tenant` **Act in accounts with the credentials it holds.** Its effect is **no**: cannot be undone. ## What this id is made of **This is not a string.** It is [`authenticate-as`](../../../model/lexicon/verbs/authenticate-as/index.md)`.`[`credential`](../../../model/lexicon/objects/credential/index.md)`.`[`tenant`](../../../model/lexicon/reaches/tenant/index.md), three nodes joined by three edges, and each of them has an address, a page and a JSON file. Follow any of them and you get the query for that word rather than a definition of it. | Node | Edge | Reads as | |---|---|---| | [`authenticate-as`](../../../model/lexicon/verbs/authenticate-as/index.md) | `has_verb` | this capability has the verb `authenticate-as` | | [`credential`](../../../model/lexicon/objects/credential/index.md) | `acts_on` | this capability acts on `credential` | | [`tenant`](../../../model/lexicon/reaches/tenant/index.md) | `reaches` | this capability reaches `tenant` | | [`identity`](../../../model/lexicon/families/identity/index.md) | `in_family` | this capability is in the `identity` family | | [`no`](../../../model/undo/index.md) | `has_undo_class` | this capability has the undo class `no` | > **The gloss above is a convenience, not the definition.** A node carries no inherent meaning: what `authenticate-as.credential.tenant` is emerges from the edges traceable from it. The strongest case is [`tenant`](../../../model/lexicon/reaches/tenant/index.md), where the deployment shapes that use it **do not agree** about what it means, and the page keeps the disagreement rather than averaging it. ## In 15 of 17 published shapes | | Deployment shape | Barrier there | Known by | Whose material | Note | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | ○ | Claude Code on the web (a remote session container) | boundary | inferred | not stated | five key-shaped variables and a code-host token - the platform's, scoped to in-scope repositories; it acts as the platform's app, never as you | | ● | Claude Code (the CLI, on your own machine) | none (not a control) | derived | not stated | inferred from the credentials the account holds | | ● | Claude Code (the CLI, on your own machine) | none (not a control) | derived | not stated | inferred from the credentials the account holds | | ● | Claude Desktop (a desktop app with local tools) | none (not a control) | derived | not stated | | | ○ | Claude (in the browser, with connectors switched on) | boundary | derived | not stated | a cloud connector acts as you | | ○ | Claude, with the Gmail connector enabled *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | measured | own | acts as the account holder over the Gmail data of the connected account. "Claude mirrors your existing permissions - you cannot access information you don't already have access to in Google Workspace." The OAuth application is named "Claude for Gmail" on Google's screens. Measured 2026-09-16: the three Google screens - choose an account; "Sign in to Claude for Gmail"; "Claude for Gmail wants access to your Google Account" with the three scope lines pre-ticked - are transcribed in evidence/. | | ○ | Claude, with the Gmail connector enabled *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | measured | organisation | acts as the account holder over one mailbox, and sends as whatever the account's default send-as entry is. The operator set that default to a disclosed agent alias on a second domain, DKIM signed and confirmed aligned by a live round trip. So the agent sends as the business and cannot send as anything else, including the account's primary address. | | ○ | Claude's Microsoft 365 connector (Outlook, SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams) *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | documented | own | "Users can only access Microsoft 365 data they already have permission for." Anthropic hosts the connector and holds the token. | | ○ | The official Dropbox MCP server *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | documented | own | "Get the authenticated Dropbox user's identity, team/account context"; the server acts as the account, and for team users GetUsageAndQuota "will retrieve the usage and quota for the entire team". | | ◐ | A browser extension with broad host permissions | setting (not a control) | documented | not stated | acts inside sites where you have a session, as you | | ● | A scheduled job running as a service account | none (not a control) | derived | not stated | a service-account credential, rarely rotated | | ○ | An assistant connected to a personal Google Drive with drive.readonly *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | documented | own | the connector acts as the account holder | | ○ | An assistant connected to a personal Gmail mailbox with gmail.readonly *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | documented | own | the connector acts as the account holder, over everything the scope names | | ○ | The Google Workspace MCP servers (Gmail, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Calendar, Chat) *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | boundary | documented | own | every server acts as the user who consented - "inherit the same permissions and data governance controls as the user" | | ● | A self-hosted n8n instance, reached with an owner-scoped API key *(contributed by riskmandate.ai)* | none (not a control) | measured | organisation | owner level on the account's personal project; the key was held for the session only and never persisted. Everything below it follows from it. | | | Barrier | What stands in the way | Is it a control | |---|---|---|---| | ● | none | nothing in the way | no | | ◉ | expectation | a rule in prose, enforced by nobody | no | | ◐ | setting | a switch the agent's own account can flip | no | | ○ | boundary | enforced above the grant, out of the agent's reach | **yes** | ## What the starting mandates say about it | The mandate says | Which mandates | |---|---| | **authorised** | A scheduled job under a service account | | **refused** | A coding assistant on my machine, The desktop app, with local tools switched on, Chat in the browser, nothing connected, A browser extension I installed | | **unstated** | A coding assistant in a container on the web, Chat, with connectors switched on, A CI job on a hosted runner, A reader on my mailbox, Find things in the inbox, draft replies, never send, A reader on my drive, Search our tenant, read-only, Find and read my files, An assistant over my Workspace, reading, A sandbox: build and run one AI-agent workflow, What the agent inferred it was authorised to do, from one session | **Unstated is not authorised.** A mandate that never mentioned a capability did not authorise it, and the delta on every example page counts it as excess and says which kind it was. ## What would move it to the fourth barrier | What | What it costs | The barrier afterwards | |---|---|---| | scoped, short-lived tokens issued to the agent rather than your own; read-only where read is all it needs | an hour per service, and rotation | boundary | > **This is a published reduction, not a recommendation.** Whether it is worth doing depends on the assets and the consequences, which are not in this document and are not this site's to guess. Since v0.4.3 it is also a node, `setting/authenticate-as.credential.tenant`, in [the deployment shape universe](../../../model/universes/u2/index.md): it **narrows** this capability and **moves** it to the barrier named in the third column, which is the path the prohibitions table's last column is a projection of. [The capability grammar](../../../model/capabilities/index.md) · [This primitive as JSON](../../../data/capabilities.json) --- *[Site index for agents](../../../llms.txt) · [HTML version](https://abp.sgit.ai/model/capabilities/authenticate-as.credential.tenant/index.html)*