03 — Worked Examples and the Live Vaults

The proof layer. Three fully worked risk graphs with node and edge counts, four published vaults with read keys, and every citable number in the corpus.

briefs/ = team/humans/dinis_cruz/briefs/.

A · The four published vaults

These are live, browsable, and have published read keys. They are the strongest asset the site has and should be first-class, not a demos page.

Why each belongs on risks.sgit.ai

• Risk Graph Explorer — the ghosted-edge convention is concept C17 (not knowing is a fact) rendered. Nothing else in the estate makes an absence visible.
• Agentic Browser Isolation — C2 (no-deny) and C4 (unaccepted = critical) running on real data across five altitudes. Assertion becomes demonstration.
• Risk Mandate — 98 commits of the method applied to itself.
• Regulation Graph — supplies Article 9(5) (the undefined "acceptable"), Article 14 (the plug obligation) and Article 26(5)/(6) (the worked example anchor). The concepts hang off real provisions.

⚠️ Publishing rules. Read keys yes, write keys never; escrow the write key before publishing, because a vault whose write key is lost is frozen — permanently readable, never updatable. The Regulation Graph is already a redacted republication after an audit found a plaintext key in its history; adopt its PUBLIC.md transparency convention. Source: briefs/08/14/sgit-site-and-hub/v0.33.58__strategy-brief__sgit-topic-sections-catalogue-read-keys-yes-write-keys-never-frozen-vaults.md

B · The worked graphs

4.1 The 2FA worked example (26 June 2026) — the founding scenario

06/26/risk-register-and-five-whys/v0.33.35__arch-brief__...md and 06/26/semantic-graph-and-query-paths/v0.33.35__arch-brief__...2fa-use-case...md.

• Vulnerability V1: admin accounts lack 2FA, backed by E1 (configuration shows no MFA).
• Attack ATK-1: credential stuffing, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1110.004, performed by TA-1.
• Risks R1–R9: R1 accounts compromised; R2 governance air gap (accepted by the wrong owner) — accepted by Head of GRC at a 4h interval (P1), propagating GRC → CIO → CEO → Board, each accepting at 4h because that is the only option open to them; R3 unauthorised HR admin access; R4 risk mis-classified until investigated (spawned by fact F5, which lacks evidence); R5 data incident + R6 GDPR breach (two distinct risks); R7 salary/record tampering or fabricated hires; R8 weekly-backup data-loss window; R9 restore never tested.
• Interval resolution for R3: 4h struck off (not technically possible), 48h = P1, 2w = incident, 1–2m = funded project, 6m = do nothing. Evidence E3 ("no evidence of compromise") backs the absence of clear and present danger; E4 = backup logs show weekly; E5 = no record of a tested restore.
• Data classification is the blast-radius multiplier: DC-1 full HR data (passports, salaries, bonuses, PIPs, reviews, hires, fires, dismissals) vs DC-2 anonymised timesheets.
• Ontology size: 24 node classes, 34 edge types.

4.2 The browser-isolation business case (12 July 2026) — the largest single graph

07/12/worked-business-case/v0.33.48__briefing__...five-levels-graph.md. Parsed from the embedded JSON:

• 59 nodes, 75 edges.
• Node type distribution: Risk 13, Owner 7, Evidence 6, Vulnerability 6, Fact 5, Asset 4, Measure 4, PreventiveControl 3, Grant 2, AuthorizationClosure 2, BlastRadius 2, AcceptanceDecision 2, Reality 1, Twin 1, DetectiveControl 1.
• Edge type distribution: gives_rise_to 22, backed_by 14, owned_by 11, measured_by 5, protected_by 5, exposes 3, reaches 3, observed_on 2, grants 2, accepted_by 2, underwritten_by 2, connected_to 1, impairs 1, emits 1, conditional_on 1.
• Structured as F1–F8 facts, E1–E8 evidence, V1–V6 vulnerabilities, R1–R5 risks, L1–L5 altitudes (IT/desktop → CISO → CFO/COO/DPO → CEO → Board).
• Concrete figure: vendor system cards reporting browser prompt-injection attack success rates falling from roughly half to about one percent across a single model generation — cited deliberately as the honest counterweight, since it is a large real improvement that still does not reach zero.
• Three risks of the mitigation itself are on the register: concentrated platform dependency, the platform now seeing the content, and friction routing users around it.

4.3 The Article 26(5) creditworthiness example (2 August 2026) — the complete instance

08/02/vault-as-substrate/v0.33.55__arch-brief__...article-26-5...md. Its own Node and Edge Inventory table:

Hard numbers inside it: thirty days log retention observed vs at least six months required by Article 26(6) — "arithmetic, not judgement, which makes it the most defensible finding in the graph." Acceptance intervals: D1 = 1 month, D2 = 1 month, D3 = none, D4 = 3 months. Proposed new edge types: governed_by, in_scope_when, answers, re_rates.

4.4 The plug register (24 July 2026)

07/24/who-can-pull-the-plug/v0.33.51__strategy-brief__...five-dimension-profile.md — a seven-row register re-expressed in the five-dimension profile, spanning from "Agent misuses the isolated session" (IT / small / fast / high recoverability) through "Agent misuses the platform itself" (COO/procurement / large / slow-contractual / medium) to "Data leaves the boundary" and "Unattributable transaction" (recoverability: zero) and "Governance residual" (the board / slowest / lowest).

4.5 The ten scenarios (2 July 2026) — the shipped MVP content

07/02/risk-acceptance-and-scenarios/v0.33.40__strategy-brief__...how-long-would-you-accept...md: every email you own; your calendar; your private messages; the company card; the OAuth token; all your repositories; the production database; your unlocked laptop; a database of customers' passwords; one customer reaching another. Each written as hook → reveal → punchline, the punchline always "how long?" Slide four shows the interval choices: an hour, four hours, a day, a week, a month, six months.

4.6 Concrete figures scattered across the corpus, with sources

C · Prior art — published risk articles on docs.diniscruz.ai

59,131 words across 8 articles, February – July 2025 — a year before the __Send corpus, in the founder's public voice, already circulated. Full metadata with canonical URLs, first-published dates, authors, PDFs and LinkedIn posts in sources__docs-diniscruz-ai-risk.json.

Two are directly load-bearing. Maturity Models vs. Traditional Standards (Apr 2025) is the ancestor of RAMM, a year early. Finding the "Good Enough" Threshold (Jul 2025) is the ancestor of C5 and C25 — it is the appetite argument before it had the vocabulary, and it carries 15 mentions of risk acceptance / appetite, the highest density on the site.

⚠️ Provenance contract applies. Anything republished keeps its original date, original link, original co-authors and an honest curation label — the same rules as the newsroom pack. docs.diniscruz.ai is CC0 at source; the sgit.ai estate is CC BY 4.0. State the source licence per page.

This document is released under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0).

== briefs/04__riskmandate-refactor.md — source document, verbatim