03 — Site Architecture: `threat-modeling.sgit.ai`

Version v0.33.63 · 7 September 2026 Base House pattern (copy pki.sgit.ai): llms.txt + /llms-full.txt, /documents/ raw markdown, markdown twin at every URL, /admin/comms.html, /shipped/, versions, participant page.

1. URL scheme

/                        the thesis: a threat model is a claim; here are ours being checked
/eleven-layers/          the ThreatModCon 2025 vault, embedded + explained
/validated/              the 16→17 March claim-and-check pair, side by side
/papers/                 the seven white papers, one page each
/papers/<slug>/          summary, key claims, PDF + LinkedIn links, co-authorship note
/practice/               the method: bottom-up file-by-file, the parallel security tree
/practice/security-json/ the .security.json schema as a reusable artefact
/practice/stride/        STRIDE applied with honest mitigation status
/practice/two-modes/     the do-not-average-two-modes pattern
/graph/                  threat models as vault-native graph data
/disclosure/             the mandatory-disclosure position
/agentic/                threat-modeling AI systems (prompt injection, agent permissions)
/documents/              raw markdown of everything

2. The spine: claim → check

Every substantive page carries the same two-part structure the corpus already uses: what we claimed and what checking it produced. /validated/ is the purest instance; /practice/stride/ shows it as NOT MITIGATED rows; /eleven-layers/ shows it as the data-repair note. Do not build a page that makes a claim with nothing checking it.

3. Data model

Threat models are graph data, not prose — that is the whole argument, and the site must not contradict it by being a pile of markdown. Each published model gets a JSON twin: nodes (Asset, Threat, Vulnerability, Mitigation, Actor, Incident), edges (targets, mitigates, is-instance-of, crosses-trust-boundary), and per-finding status. /eleven-layers/ already has this shape upstream — 51 nodes, 179 threats — so it is the schema's proof rather than a new invention.

Generated, not claimed: node/threat/finding counts, the corpus file counts, and the validation verdict tallies all come from the data. Date every one.

4. Deconfliction with siblings

Topic	Owner	This site's part
Wardley maps as a technique	`wardley-maps.sgit.ai`	Only the five threat-prioritisation walkthroughs, as an application
G³, MGraph-DB, graph theory	the graphs sibling	Only threat-model-shaped graphs; link out for the substrate
ISO 27001, EU AI Act, GDPR	`standards.sgit.ai`	Only framework-overlay-as-graph-edge; standards text stays there
Risk registers, acceptance	`risks.sgit.ai`	Only the `risk_decision` field as it appears in the security schema
Vault mechanics, keys	`pki.sgit.ai` / sgit.ai	Only what a threat model needs to say about them
NFR security posture	`nfrs.sgit.ai`	Threat modelling is the method; NFR owns the property

The rule that keeps this clean: this site owns the act of modelling threats. If material is about the thing being modelled rather than the modelling, it belongs to a sibling.

5. The ThreatModCon vault is embedded, not copied

/eleven-layers/ embeds the live vault (the vault-app-embed pattern from sgit.ai's own demos), with the explanation around it. Do not re-host the eleven models as site pages — the vault is the artefact, and a published vault demonstrating the platform's own argument is worth more than a static copy.

6. What this site does NOT do

No threat-modelling-as-a-service pitch on the main line (the 9 June services paper lives under /papers/ clearly labelled as positioning). No open findings against live systems, including third parties (04__). No methodology comparison table that declares a winner — the corpus's position is that fragmentation is solved by linking methods in a graph, not by picking one.

This document is released under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0).