write.budget.tenant
Spend money or tokens against an account it holds. Its effect is no: cannot be undone.
What this id is made of
This is not a string. It is write↗.budget↗.tenant↗, three nodes joined by three edges, and each of them has an address, a page and a JSON file. Follow any of them and you get the query for that word rather than a definition of it.
| Node | Edge | Reads as |
|---|---|---|
write↗ | has_verb | this capability has the verb write |
budget↗ | acts_on | this capability acts on budget |
tenant↗ | reaches | this capability reaches tenant |
money↗ | in_family | this capability is in the money family |
no↗ | has_undo_class | this capability has the undo class no |
The gloss above is a convenience, not the definition. A node carries no inherent meaning: what
write.budget.tenantis emerges from the edges traceable from it. The strongest case istenant↗, where the deployment shapes that use it do not agree about what it means, and the page keeps the disagreement rather than averaging it.
In 2 of 17 published shapes
| Deployment shape | Barrier there | Known by | Whose material | Note | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ● | A scheduled job running as a service account | none (not a control) | derived | not stated | if the credential is billed |
| ● | A self-hosted n8n instance, reached with an owner-scoped API key (contributed by riskmandate.ai) | none (not a control) | measured | organisation | a real model credential was added by the deployer through the UI and a real execution returned a model response through the node - spend against that account, as the workflow's author. The first attempt failed with "does not have access to the credential": a wrong reference from ambiguous name matching between two credentials of the same type, not a barrier, found only once the MCP interface could list them. |
| Barrier | What stands in the way | Is it a control | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ● | none | nothing in the way | no |
| ◉ | expectation | a rule in prose, enforced by nobody | no |
| ◐ | setting | a switch the agent's own account can flip | no |
| ○ | boundary | enforced above the grant, out of the agent's reach | yes |
What the starting mandates say about it
| The mandate says | Which mandates |
|---|---|
| authorised | A sandbox: build and run one AI-agent workflow |
| refused | Chat in the browser, nothing connected, A scheduled job under a service account |
| unstated | A coding assistant on my machine, A coding assistant in a container on the web, The desktop app, with local tools switched on, Chat, with connectors switched on, A CI job on a hosted runner, A browser extension I installed, A reader on my mailbox, Find things in the inbox, draft replies, never send, A reader on my drive, Search our tenant, read-only, Find and read my files, An assistant over my Workspace, reading, What the agent inferred it was authorised to do, from one session |
Unstated is not authorised. A mandate that never mentioned a capability did not authorise it, and the delta on every example page counts it as excess and says which kind it was.
What would move it to the fourth barrier
| What | What it costs | The barrier afterwards |
|---|---|---|
| a spend cap at the supplier, set by somebody other than the agent - the supplier has a reason to refuse: it is paying | the work stops when the cap is reached, which is the point | boundary |
This is a published reduction, not a recommendation. Whether it is worth doing depends on the assets and the consequences, which are not in this document and are not this site's to guess. Since v0.4.3 it is also a node,
setting/write.budget.tenant, in the deployment shape universe↗: it narrows this capability and moves it to the barrier named in the third column, which is the path the prohibitions table's last column is a projection of.
The capability grammar↗ · This primitive as JSON↗
Site index for agents↗ · HTML version↗