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write.budget.tenant

Spend money or tokens against an account it holds. Reach tenant, undo no. Which published deployment shapes have it, at what barrier, and what the starting mandates say.

Source: https://abp.sgit.ai/model/capabilities/write.budget.tenant/index.html↗ · site v0.11.0 · this file is generated from the same content as the page, so the two cannot drift. Every page on this site has a .md twin; internal links below point at them.


Home↗ / The model↗ / The capabilities↗ / write.budget.tenant

write.budget.tenant

Spend money or tokens against an account it holds. Its effect is no: cannot be undone.

What this id is made of

This is not a string. It is write↗.budget↗.tenant↗, three nodes joined by three edges, and each of them has an address, a page and a JSON file. Follow any of them and you get the query for that word rather than a definition of it.

NodeEdgeReads as
write↗has_verbthis capability has the verb write
budget↗acts_onthis capability acts on budget
tenant↗reachesthis capability reaches tenant
money↗in_familythis capability is in the money family
no↗has_undo_classthis capability has the undo class no

The gloss above is a convenience, not the definition. A node carries no inherent meaning: what write.budget.tenant is emerges from the edges traceable from it. The strongest case is tenant↗, where the deployment shapes that use it do not agree about what it means, and the page keeps the disagreement rather than averaging it.

In 2 of 17 published shapes

Deployment shapeBarrier thereKnown byWhose materialNote
●A scheduled job running as a service accountnone (not a control)derivednot statedif the credential is billed
●A self-hosted n8n instance, reached with an owner-scoped API key (contributed by riskmandate.ai)none (not a control)measuredorganisationa real model credential was added by the deployer through the UI and a real execution returned a model response through the node - spend against that account, as the workflow's author. The first attempt failed with "does not have access to the credential": a wrong reference from ambiguous name matching between two credentials of the same type, not a barrier, found only once the MCP interface could list them.
BarrierWhat stands in the wayIs it a control
●nonenothing in the wayno
◉expectationa rule in prose, enforced by nobodyno
◐settinga switch the agent's own account can flipno
○boundaryenforced above the grant, out of the agent's reachyes

What the starting mandates say about it

The mandate saysWhich mandates
authorisedA sandbox: build and run one AI-agent workflow
refusedChat in the browser, nothing connected, A scheduled job under a service account
unstatedA coding assistant on my machine, A coding assistant in a container on the web, The desktop app, with local tools switched on, Chat, with connectors switched on, A CI job on a hosted runner, A browser extension I installed, A reader on my mailbox, Find things in the inbox, draft replies, never send, A reader on my drive, Search our tenant, read-only, Find and read my files, An assistant over my Workspace, reading, What the agent inferred it was authorised to do, from one session

Unstated is not authorised. A mandate that never mentioned a capability did not authorise it, and the delta on every example page counts it as excess and says which kind it was.

What would move it to the fourth barrier

WhatWhat it costsThe barrier afterwards
a spend cap at the supplier, set by somebody other than the agent - the supplier has a reason to refuse: it is payingthe work stops when the cap is reached, which is the pointboundary

This is a published reduction, not a recommendation. Whether it is worth doing depends on the assets and the consequences, which are not in this document and are not this site's to guess. Since v0.4.3 it is also a node, setting/write.budget.tenant, in the deployment shape universe↗: it narrows this capability and moves it to the barrier named in the third column, which is the path the prohibitions table's last column is a projection of.

The capability grammar↗ · This primitive as JSON↗


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