send.endpoint.allowed
Reach a permitted list of hosts. Reach tenant, undo no. Which published deployment shapes have it, at what barrier, and what the starting mandates say.
Source: https://abp.sgit.ai/model/capabilities/send.endpoint.allowed/index.html↗ · site v0.11.0 · this file is generated from the same content
as the page, so the two cannot drift. Every page on this site has a .md twin; internal links
below point at them.
Home↗ / The model↗ / The capabilities↗ / send.endpoint.allowed
send.endpoint.allowed
Reach a permitted list of hosts. Its effect is no: cannot be undone.
What this id is made of
This is not a string. It is send↗.network-endpoint↗.tenant↗, three nodes joined by three edges, and each of them has an address, a page and a JSON file. Follow any of them and you get the query for that word rather than a definition of it.
| Node | Edge | Reads as |
|---|---|---|
send↗ | has_verb | this capability has the verb send |
network-endpoint↗ | acts_on | this capability acts on network-endpoint |
tenant↗ | reaches | this capability reaches tenant |
network↗ | in_family | this capability is in the network family |
no↗ | has_undo_class | this capability has the undo class no |
The gloss above is a convenience, not the definition. A node carries no inherent meaning: what
send.endpoint.allowedis emerges from the edges traceable from it. The strongest case istenant↗, where the deployment shapes that use it do not agree about what it means, and the page keeps the disagreement rather than averaging it.
In 1 of 17 published shapes
| Deployment shape | Barrier there | Known by | Whose material | Note | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ○ | Claude Code on the web (a remote session container) | boundary | observed | not stated | six of six probed hosts answered through the proxy; a sibling container measured on 4 September had three refused: same product, two policies |
| Barrier | What stands in the way | Is it a control | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ● | none | nothing in the way | no |
| ◉ | expectation | a rule in prose, enforced by nobody | no |
| ◐ | setting | a switch the agent's own account can flip | no |
| ○ | boundary | enforced above the grant, out of the agent's reach | yes |
What the starting mandates say about it
| The mandate says | Which mandates |
|---|---|
| authorised | A coding assistant on my machine, A coding assistant in a container on the web, The desktop app, with local tools switched on, A scheduled job under a service account |
| refused | none |
| unstated | Chat, with connectors switched on, Chat in the browser, nothing connected, A CI job on a hosted runner, A browser extension I installed, A reader on my mailbox, Find things in the inbox, draft replies, never send, A reader on my drive, Search our tenant, read-only, Find and read my files, An assistant over my Workspace, reading, A sandbox: build and run one AI-agent workflow, What the agent inferred it was authorised to do, from one session |
Unstated is not authorised. A mandate that never mentioned a capability did not authorise it, and the delta on every example page counts it as excess and says which kind it was.
What would move it to the fourth barrier
| What | What it costs | The barrier afterwards |
|---|---|---|
| shorten the list; a host it does not need is a host it can reach | minutes per host, and a failure the first time it needs one you removed | boundary |
This is a published reduction, not a recommendation. Whether it is worth doing depends on the assets and the consequences, which are not in this document and are not this site's to guess. Since v0.4.3 it is also a node,
setting/send.endpoint.allowed, in the deployment shape universe↗: it narrows this capability and moves it to the barrier named in the third column, which is the path the prohibitions table's last column is a projection of.
The capability grammar↗ · This primitive as JSON↗